It has been observed that COVID‐19 infection does not distinguish by social class, nor gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation. No particular social group can be stigmatised as the *infected other*, as with the ethical‐moral weight that fell on gay men during the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s or disdain for the poor, as with leprosy. Emerging (but still inconclusive) research challenges this view, and attitudes are in any case susceptible to change in the future as new hierarchies take form with access to care. But, for the moment, COVID‐19's ostensible egalitarianism poses a curious situation in which the only precondition for infection seems to be life itself, and the only discerning category of the contagious is the *body of the other*. Although the enterprise of quarantine is obviously nothing more than separation of people from other people who might carry the virus, the existential emergency of the endeavour, and its scale, is perhaps less obvious.

Mary Douglas classified *pollution*, meaning the possibility of contamination, as being of two kinds: instrumental and expressive. Instrumental meaning that the enforcing of pollution becomes coercive in society. Social distancing protocols placed by the state and enforced coercively by society is one example of this. The expressive dimension of pollution, on the other hand, is one that falls into the realm of ethics. Douglas offers the example of the Nuer's variation of the incest taboo, which is grounded in the speculation that incest causes skin diseases. Now, if 'a little incest' does happen, its ill‐effects can be mitigated by sacrifice. Douglas posits that these cases of exception contribute to the overall Nuer social structure, as evidenced by the ritual restitutory clause. The taboo is thus integral, she concludes, to the Nuer 'public conscience'.

When combined, instrumental and expressive aspects of pollution constitute a total saturation of experience with practical and ethical dimensions. In a sense, here we have a rejoinder of Giorgio Agamben's typology of a kind of life that is an ethical adventure worth living, and a kind of life that does not amount to much more than mere biology. Incidentally, Agamben has himself contributed to a curious debate[^1] among a coterie of philosophers on COVID‐19. Agamben laments that measures of social distancing, quarantine, the shutting down of public life, etc. fail to consider humanity as anything more than animal herds under the God‐shepherd figure of the state. Without the qualitatively human joys of embracing one another, theatre‐going, participating in collective sensible acts, etc., we are reduced, so goes this position, to nothing but biological fact. Agamben has been rightly criticised for this possibly fatalistic allusion that people should go on living life as normal in these times of pandemic. But, at the same time, the Nuer example invites us to not be oblivious to the anthropological truth that ethical life is greatly determined by rules of separation. A normalisation of quarantine poses a structural shift in our ethical compass, risking, as it were, a *fear of others*.

[^1]: See [https://www.journal‐psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus‐and‐philosophers/](https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers/) (Accessed May 2020).
